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POPULISM AND MEDIA POLICY FAILURE 
 
The ‘parade of the aghast’ 
 
One of the explanations for the rise in prominence of populist challenges to centrist political 
forces has focused on the former’s effective use of the media: their ability to transmit ‘sentiment’ 
over ‘fact’, to use ‘authentic’ language, to make full use of social media and to exploit the 
mainstream media’s appetite for sensationalist stories. ‘All neo-populist movements’, argues 
Gianpetro Mazzoleni (2003: 6), ‘rely heavily on some kind of indirect (and direct) complicity 
with the mass media, and all are led by politicians who, with few exceptions, are shrewd and 
capable “newsmakers” themselves.’ In Europe and North America, this has worked to the 
advantage of iconoclastic far right politicians like Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders 
in the Netherlands and the former UKIP leader Nigel Farage who have all received extensive 
airtime in which they have combined nativist rhetoric with outbursts against the political 
establishment (no matter how privileged they themselves may be). A dangerous cocktail of 
tabloid values, falling levels of trust in the media and unaccountable tech power (facilitating the 
spread of hyper-partisan and sometimes ‘fake’ news) is widely seen to be intimately linked to the 
rise in recent years both of a xenophobic populism and polarised media and political 
environments (Barnett, 2017; Benkler et al, 2017, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 
2017). 
 Yet the political earthquakes of Trump and Brexit were greeted with astonishment and 
confusion by some of the most prestigious names in mainstream journalism who had, to use a 
popular expression, misread the tea-leaves. Trump’s victory, for example, ‘was the night that 
		
wasn’t supposed to happen, that had almost no chance of happening’ opined the public editor of 
the New York Times (Spayd, 2016) while her bosses, publisher Arthur O. Sulzberger Jr and editor 
Dean Baquet (2017), admitted that ‘[a]fter such an erratic and unpredictable election there are 
inevitable questions: Did Donald Trump’s sheer unconventionality lead us and other news outlets 
to underestimate his support among American voters?’ Reporters at Politico were blunt: ‘we 
were more than wrong. We were laughably oblivious. The entre Washington political-media 
complex missed the mark. Not by inches or feet, but by miles…There will be plenty of time to 
dissect it all. The joke is on us’ (Palmer and Sherman, 2016). The joke wasn’t just confined to 
the US: for Jon Snow, the veteran presenter of Channel Four News, the British media ‘failed, not 
only over the [Brexit] Referendum, but perhaps over reporting Europe at all down the 40 years of 
the UK’s membership. Amid the fresh mown lies (or fake news) of the campaign itself, we didn’t 
have a chance’ (Snow 2017).  
Elite journalism, however, largely recused itself from any direct responsibility for events 
such as Trump and Brexit and instead embarked on what some journalists described as a period 
of self-reflection: ‘to ‘think hard about the half of America the paper too seldom covers’ 
according to the NYT’s Spayd (2016) and, for Sulzberger and Baquet (2016), to ‘rededicate 
ourselves to the fundamental mission of Times journalism…to hold power to account, 
impartially and unflinchingly’. Modest changes have been made: mastheads have been amended 
(for example, the Washington Post’s ‘Democracy Dies in Darkness’) and mission statements 
revised, such as the Guardian editor’s promise relentlessly to ‘challenge the economic 
assumptions of the last three decades, which have extended market values such as competition 
and self-interest far beyond their natural sphere and seized the public realm’ (Viner, 2017). 
Additionally, robust ‘anti-populist’ editorial stances have been widely adopted as demonstrated 
		
by the NYT’s decision to publicly denounce Trump as a ‘liar’ and the tidal wave of anti-Trump 
coverage across liberal broadcast and print news outlets in response to his presidency (Patterson, 
2017). While this strategy has been good for business – there has been a spike in subscriptions 
following the election of Trump and Brexit to outlets like the Post, the NYT, Vanity Fair and the 
Guardian together with rising viewing figures for CNN and MSNBC (Doctor, 2017) – it is less 
clear how effective this will be in holding reactionary populism to account. For example, the US 
journalist Thomas Frank has described ‘Trump denunciation’ as ‘a parade of the aghast’ in which 
‘all the skills of the journalist [have been] reduced to a performance of perturbation and disgust’ 
(Frank 2017), a situation that does little either to undermine Trump himself or to discover the 
roots of the problems that may have engineered his election success.  
Similarly, little attention has been paid to the structural conditions that underlie what 
Victor Pickard calls the ‘misinformation society’ and of the ‘commercial imperatives [that] drove 
news organizations to popularize a dangerous politics’ (Pickard, 2018: 195). In particular, there 
has been scant critical examination of the policy actions (and inactions) that have facilitated 
environments in which the coverage of populist leaders and narratives is not simply profitable 
but the logical outcome of media markets in liberal democracies that are wedded to ratings and 
controversy. Minor editorial changes and software updates are hardly likely to compensate for 
the systemic degeneration of communication systems in which power has been increasingly 
consolidated by oligopolistic digital intermediaries and media giants, in which liberal news 
media have failed sufficiently to address the roots of polarisation, in which public media have 
increasingly been identified not as monitors but as embodiments of elite power and, finally, in 
which highly partisan right wing media have been emboldened and rewarded.  
		
In this combustible context, this article reflects on the implication for media systems of 
liberal conceptions of right-wing populism that see it as a threat to ‘reason’ and social order as 
well as to consensual and ‘objective’ journalism. From this ‘anti-populist’ perspective, ‘mediated 
populism’ can be seen as an example of ‘policy failure’ yet the underlying reasons for this 
failure, and especially the idea that we might want to consider fresh policy options that would 
foster more diverse and democratic media environments, are all too often ignored. The article 
does not claim that this failure has led to the rise of right-wing populism nor does it claim that 
there is a media policy ‘solution’ to the populist surge. Instead it argues that existing liberal 
approaches to media policy have contributed to highly unequal and distorted communication 
systems that have been exploited by forces on the far right and that need to be corrected as part 
of a broader challenge to right-wing populism. These failings in media systems have previously 
been explained by concepts such as ‘policy failure’ (Pickard, 2014), ‘regulatory failure’ 
(Horwitz, 1989) and ‘media policy silences’ (Freedman, 2014) but they are just as relevant to 
contemporary spaces in which ‘misinformation’ thrives and xenophobia and white nationalism 
are able to find their voice.  
The article focuses largely on examples from the US and the UK not because they 
epitomise some sort of undifferentiated ‘global populism’ (see Chakravartty and Roy, 2017 for a 
fascinating account of ‘mediatised populisms’ across the Inter-Asian region; see also Artz, 2017, 
for an equally interesting collection of essays on populist media policies across Latin America) 
but because, since the 1980s, they have provided some of the earliest and most visible examples 
of an emerging market-oriented communications policy paradigm characterised, according to 
Van Cuilenburg and McQuail (2003: 197), by a susceptibility to ‘[p]ragmatism and populism’. 
Of course there is an enormous difference between the hypercommercial US media, the mixed 
		
ecology of the UK and far more regulated Scandinavian media systems but none of them are 
insulated from the market pressures and technological affordances that are re-writing 
contemporary political communications landscapes. The article first poses a particular way of 
framing populism, considers the strengths and weaknesses of theories of ‘mediated populism’ 
and then identifies four areas of ‘policy failure’ that have nurtured highly skewed media 
environments in which far right perspectives have been widely amplified. The article concludes 
with a call to devise a new policy paradigm based around redistribution that aims that to 
reconstruct media systems in order both to resist both state and market capture and to undermine 
the appeal of populist forces on the far right. 
 
Populism as policy failure 
 
Without wishing to add to the ‘terminological chaos’ that, according to Cas Mudde (2007: 12) 
marks the scholarship on populism, this article seeks less to define right-wing populism than to 
understand it from the perspective of some of its harshest critics from the political centre: as an 
existential threat to liberal democracy. True, there do appear to be some common tropes that 
circumscribe populism as a specific type of political phenomenon: its ‘anti-pluralism’(Mueller, 
2016), its appeal to a ‘pure people’ in opposition to a ‘corrupt elite’ (Mudde, 2007: 23), its ‘anti-
status quo dimension’ (Panizza, 2005: 3), its distinct and vernacular ‘political style’ (Moffitt, 
2016) and finally, as I have already noted, its dependence on ‘media action’ (Mazzoleni, 2008: 
50). What I am most interested in, however, is the extent to which contemporary populism is 
condemned as a form of ‘illiberal democracy’ – as class- and identity-based movements that seek 
		
to mobilize ‘resistance to moderate, centrist or established political elites from both sides of the 
political spectrum’ (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2017: 46). 
 Far right populism, understood in these terms, is not just as a challenge to representative 
forms of democracy but – especially given its recent electoral successes – as evidence of a more 
profound breakdown of the ‘centre ground’. In this sense, it can be conceptualised as a type of 
‘market failure’ arising out of the inability of liberal politics to cater effectively to all tastes and 
demographics by over-representing those people whose interests it deems to be most ‘lucrative’ 
(for example, middle-class voters who are seen as low-risk) and marginalising those who are 
more ‘expensive’ to seek out (those who are seen to be ‘high risk’ such as the poor and the 
marginalised). This is similar to the sorts of market failure generated in a range of industries 
(including the media) which then require particular kinds of corrective policy actions, not least to 
address the ‘information asymmetries’ (Stiglitz, 1998: 13) and unwelcome externalities (of 
which right-wing populism is clearly one) that distort the production and allocation of goods. 
Liberal democracy appears to be suffering from the same set of problems: it has super-served 
elites and under-served minorities and the poor (Piketty, 2014) while fostering a polarised and 
asymmetrical public sphere (Benkler et al, 2017); its adherents across Western Europe and North 
America have implemented austerity programmes that both intensify inequality and roll back the 
traditional welfarist ‘market failure’ policies that might help to ameliorate the pain (if not, of 
course, to address its underlying causes) (Blyth, 2013). Populists, meanwhile, have been very 
quick to take advantage of this market failure by reaching out to those individuals and groups 
whose interests do not lie within this narrowly defined liberal market consensus and by 
attempting to represent their cultural and economic anxieties. Neoliberalism may not the sole 
		
cause of contemporary populisms but it has certainly intensified the economic and cultural 
tensions on which far right populists have been quick to prey. 
 This ‘dismissal’ of populism by liberal elites is, according to Ernesto Laclau, ‘part of the 
discursive construction of a certain normality, of an ascetic political universe from which its 
dangerous logics had to be excluded’ (2005: 19). For Laclau, this involves not simply the elite’s 
fear of rowdy crowds and dissenting publics but also its denigration of populism’s simplistic, 
binarized operating system as ‘irrational and undefinable’ (2005: 16). In this context, liberal 
democracy’s failure to address the underlying grievances caused by neoliberal policies that have 
increased inequality and diminished the public sphere (Brown, 2015) has provided fertile ground 
for the right-wing populism that is the focus of this article. Populism’s opacity and the 
‘emptiness’ of its political symbols (Laclau, 2005: 12) means that it is ripe for exploitation by 
competing political forces with very different attitudes towards sovereignty, democracy and 
indeed the very construction of the ‘people’. However, I am less interested here in how different 
kinds of populists have battled for influence so much as whether existing pluralist media policy 
paradigms have contributed to conditions in which, in particular, illiberal political forces have 
been able to thrive. If populism is indeed, at least in part, a response to the failure of the liberal 
political market to cater for all citizens, then to what extent has this failure been facilitated by 
contemporary media policy environments and with what consequences?  
 
The rise of ‘mediated populism’ 
 
I have already referred to a growing literature that argues that a central precondition for the 
ability of populist movements to challenge the hegemony of centrist parties struggling with 
		
issues of legitimacy and trust is their ability to communicate the anger and emotion that will 
resonate with disaffected publics. Far right populist parties have been especially successful in 
winning coverage of their appeals to what Alvares and Dahlgren (2016: 49) describe as core 
populist tropes: ‘an idealised sense of historical nation and (often ethnic) community – “the 
people”, as well as a critical stance towards “the elites”.’ Ruth Wodak argues that right-wing 
populist parties are actually dependent on ‘performance strategies in modern media democracies’ 
(Wodak 2013: 27) and insists that their growth is dependent on visibility generated by the media. 
According to Gianpetro Mazzoleni, media organisations are complicit with populist movements 
in what he describes as ‘mediated populism’, defined as ‘the outcome of the close connection 
between media-originated dynamics and the rise of populist sentiments’ (2015: 376). It is thus 
increasingly difficult to imagine ‘unmediated’ forms of populism in any part of the world with 
‘mediated populisms’ apparent not simply in Europe and North America but in India 
(Chakravartty and Roy, 2015), Indonesia (McCargo, 2016) and across Latin America (Waisbord, 
2012). 
 Tabloid media, especially sensitive to market imperatives and often adept at using 
vernacular language, are often seen as key vehicles for the circulation and normalisation of 
populist ideas. Mazzoleni (2008: 59-62) maps out a ‘media-market life-cycle’ of populist 
movements in which tabloid media amplify anti-elite sentiment in an initial ‘ground-paying 
phase before bowing to the allure of populist leaders in a later ‘insurgent’ phase – precisely what 
we saw with the endless attention given to Trump, Farage, Le Pen and Modi during their 
respective election campaigns. This is followed by a more tense relationship when populist 
parties become more established and thus less of a sensational news story and, finally, a period 
of decline when the initial excitement generated by populist iconoclasm has long disappeared.  
		
Elite media, described by Mazzoleni as ‘the mouthpieces of the ruling classes’ (2008: 
51), have a rather more complicated relationship to populist movements but they are equally 
central to the legitimation of right-wing populist ideas. According to Mazzoleni, elite media 
ignore populists at first and then respond to their insurgency ‘by adopting tones of outrage and 
ridicule’ (2008: 61) – precisely the ‘aghastness’ referred to earlier by Thomas Frank. Yet the 
established news media are by no means immune to the commercial and ideological sheen of 
right-wing populism and ‘can display an unprecedented deference to populist parties that have 
gained power’ (2008: 61). Of course this is not always the case – witness their opposition to 
Trump in the US – but the establishment’s ‘sacerdotal’ attitude to power often leads to illiberal 
political forces receiving ‘compliant media treatment’ (2008: 61) from liberal media outlets who 
pave the way for the normalisation of populist agendas on, for example, topics such as 
immigration and crime (Hall et al, 2013).   
While Mazzoleni’s analysis certainly appears to fit the pattern of coverage of far right 
parties in a whole range of European countries, there are perhaps two key problems associated 
with this understanding of ‘mediated populism.’ 
The first concerns the elevation of ‘media logic’ above other factors in explaining both 
the construction and normalisation of far right movements. Although Mazzoleni insists that he is 
not making any ‘causal links between the media and the spread of populism’ (2008: 50), he 
nevertheless argues that media are inseparable from populism as it emerges in any specific 
context, generating ‘media parties’ and giving ‘status’ to what were previously dissident 
discourses. The danger is that by fetishising the role of the media, we run the risk of 
underestimating the significance of the broader political factors that play a key role in cementing 
		
the appeal of right-wing populist parties: alienation from elite institutions, cultural and economic 
insecurities and nativist opposition to immigration. 
A second problem with traditional accounts of ‘mediated populism’ is their failure to 
consider media environments as products of policy action (and inaction). While some scholars 
certainly do talk about the structural factors of media systems that pertain to the opportunities for 
populists to be widely publicised (Berry and Sobieraj, 2013; Kramer, 2014; Pickard, 2018), 
much of the literature on mediated populism remains aloof from policy debates and, therefore, 
from the possibility of policy change. Mazzoleni, for example, argues (2008: 62) that populism 
‘has its origins in the typical patterns and practices of commercial media outlets’, but he fails 
even to acknowledge that these ‘patterns and practices’ are by no means natural but the product 
of specific media policy environments and decisions. Given the salience of social media 
platforms in providing populists with additional means with which to communicate with 
supporters above and beyond traditional media, it is even more vital to reflect on the policies that 
have shaped the broader communications landscape and potentially contributed to the 
normalisation of far right ideas. Media ecologies chararcterised by high degrees of polaristion, 
falling levels of trust, weakened public service remits and oligopolistic structures all have recent 
histories that are at least partly explained by the choices made by specific policy actors. To what 
extent is ‘mediated populism’ the product not just of ‘complicit’ communication channels but, 
more specifically, of policy regimes that have generated communicative climates that the far 
right have been able to exploit? 
 
Media policy failures 
 
		
Our communications systems are not in any sense ‘natural’ but created in the shape of the vested 
interests that dominate at any one time; communications policy is a highly political, value-laden, 
interest-driven field of decision-making. Since the 1980s, this has generally followed ‘the logic 
of the marketplace’ (Van Cuilenburg and McQuail, 2003: 200) whereby decision makers have 
been in thrall to rhetorics concerning innovation, efficiency and consumer sovereignty. Under the 
guide of neoliberalism (Freedman, 2008) or ‘corporate libertarianism’ (Pickard, 2014), 
communications markets have been restructured better to enhance corporate accumulation and to 
inscribe a commercial logic ever deeper into the cultural field.  
Yet this policy restructuring is executed not simply through visible and identifiable 
legislative or regulatory acts but often through flawed decision-making processes that remove 
certain issues – notably those concerning concentrations of media power – from the policy 
agenda. Thus we have ‘media policy silences’ (Freedman, 2014) and ‘media policy failures’ 
(Pickard 2014: 216) characterized by ‘inaction’ and ‘invisibility’ and often caused by the 
ideological affinity between and mutual interests of policymakers, regulators and industry 
voices. This underlies the ‘regulatory failure’ that Robert Horwitz (1989: 29) describes as taking 
place when ‘a captured agency systematically favors the private interests of regulated parties and 
systematically ignores the public interest.’ I argue that a series of media policy failures and 
silences in relation to four areas in particular have taken place in Europe and North America in 
the last three decades that have further distorted our communications landscapes and undermined 
their ability to act as counterweights to the rise in recent years of parties and movements on the 
right.     
 
Failure to tackle concentrated ownership 
		
 
Traditional ownership controls in media markets that seek to prevent any single company from 
gaining undue dominance or any single voice from gaining undue prominence have long been a 
key part of a democratic toolkit. According to Ed Baker (2009), concentrated media ownership 
‘creates the possibility of an individual decision-maker exercising enormous unchecked, 
undemocratic, potentially demagogic power…Even if this power is seldom exercised, no 
democracy should risk the danger.’ This fear of ‘demagogues’ is at the heart of liberal opposition 
to all forms of populism – borne out by the warnings posed by the reign of former Italian prime 
minister Silvio Berlusconi whose control of media outlets was essential to his populist success. 
Yet, as a result of pressure from lobbyists arguing that ownership rules are both a brake on 
innovation and an impediment to profitability at a time when traditional business models are 
under pressure, ownership rules in countries like the US, UK, Australia and New Zealand have 
been systematically relaxed since the 1980s. We have seen consolidation in terrestrial and 
satellite television markets, in the national and local press, in wholesale and retail radio and 
online such that the top 10 content companies in a study of 30 countries from across the globe 
account for an average 67% of national market share while the top four digital platforms account 
for a whopping 88% of their national media markets (Noam, 2016: 9). 
 Let me be very clear: concentrated media markets do not create populist movements out 
of thin air and deregulation does not lead inevitably to demagoguery. Yet the desire of neoliberal 
policymakers to cement commercial values in, and to minimise regulatory controls on, 
accumulations of media power is hardly without consequence. First, this simply enhances the 
visibility, in particular, of far right politicians who can be relied upon to generate the provocative 
speech and nativist appeals that play well with ratings. As Victor Pickard has argued in relation 
		
to Trump, ‘the news media’s excessive commercialism – largely driven by profit imperatives 
and, thus the need to sell advertising – manifested in facile coverage that privileged 
entertainment over information’ (Pickard, 2018: 196). Second, size matters, especially in media 
landscapes where there is a fierce battle for attention and therefore strong incentives for political 
leaders to accommodate to media power. The agenda-setting roles of Fox News in the US or of 
the tabloid Daily Mail and the Sun in whipping up anti-immigrant sentiment in the run-up to the 
Brexit vote were partly made possible by their status as very influential players in their 
respective news media markets. As long as liberal politicians and policymakers continue to 
exercise only a rhetorical commitment to plurality, then the incentives for large news 
organisations to amplify the controversial – and often racist – content that far right populists are 
only too pleased to provide will continue to exist.      
 
Failure to regulate tech companies  
 
The failure by policymakers to tackle monopolistic behavior is particularly clear in the digital 
sphere where a handful of giant intermediaries dominate their respective markets and where 
Facebook and Google alone account for such an overwhelming proportion of advertising revenue 
that, according to the Financial Times, they ‘not only own the playing field but are able to set the 
rules of the game as well’ (Garrahan, 2016). Powered by ever-expanding piles of cash and the 
logic of network effects which rewards first-movers, these intermediaries are not simply 
expanding into associated fields but usurping some of the editorial and creative gatekeeping roles 
previously fulfilled by traditional content companies (Hesmondhalgh, 2017).  
		
This market power, combined with the specific ways in which algorithms function, has 
created giant monopolistic machines for the circulation of misinformation and propaganda that 
liberal commentators have argued has distorted recent ballots in the US and the UK (Cadwalladr, 
2017). Whether or not it can be proved that ‘fake news’ has changed the result of elections – and 
recent research suggests that its influence may well have been exaggerated (Allcott and 
Gentzkow, 2016) – it is certainly the case that Google and Facebook have created both incentives 
and systems for low-cost, highly-targeted transmission of clickbait posing as news. For Tim 
Berners-Lee, the founder of the web, the ‘system is failing…We have these dark ads that target 
and manipulate me and then vanish because I can’t bookmark them. This is not democracy – this 
is putting who gets selected into the hands of the most manipulative companies out there’ 
(quoted in Solon, 2017).  
 The problem is that this is a situation generated not simply by the computational power of 
complex algorithms but by the reluctance of regulators, up to this point, to address intermediary 
dominance. True, the European Commission did impose a €2.4 billion fine on Google in 2017 
for abusing its dominance by unduly prioritising its own price comparison service but this is 
likely to be a mere inconvenience to its parent Alphabet as opposed to a structural challenge to 
its operating model. Many regulators still refuse to acknowledge Facebook and Google as bona 
fide media companies and instead continue to rely on the same liberal policy frameworks that 
were developed in the 1990s that protected intermediaries from responsibility for the content 
they carry. US regulators like the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission do 
have antitrust remits that would enable them to challenge intermediary power but, wedded to a 
neoliberal vision of market fundamentalism, prefer to remain silent. Indeed, according to Barry 
Lynn and Matt Stoller (2017), ‘the FTC itself partially created the “fake news” problem by 
		
failing to use its existing authority to block previous acquisitions by these platforms such as 
Facebook’s purchase of WhatsApp and Instagram.’ Shackled by a worldview whose default 
position is that regulation is an impediment to innovation, the British and US governments, in 
particular, have long been content to rely on industry self-regulation that is insufficiently strong 
to pre-empt the hateful forms of speech that continue to circulate and that underpin the growth of 
far right parties. Regulation may now ensue following the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica data 
scandal but it remains an open question whether it will be tough enough to change corporate 
behaviour and transform business models unless genuinely radical action, such as breaking up or 
nationalising the largest platforms (Srnicek, 2017), is considered. 
 
Failure to safeguard an effective fourth estate 
 
First Amendment absolutism and libertarian conceptions of speech continue to undergird 
arguments against regulation of corporate interests in many liberal democracies. Yet this has not 
prevented attacks by respective states on investigative journalism, one of the hallmarks of a 
functioning ‘fourth estate’ and one of the great traditional liberal defences against demagogues 
and tyrants. In the US, before 2008, a grand total of three cases had been brought against 
whistleblowers and leakers under the terms of the Espionage Act for helping journalists to report 
on classified government programmes. The Obama administration, however, used the Act to 
launch nine cases, leading the New York Times to comment that that if ‘Donald J. Trump decides 
as president to throw a whistle-blower in jail for trying to talk to a reporter, or gets the F.B.I. to 
spy on a journalist, he will have one man to thank for bequeathing him such expansive power: 
Barack Obama’ (Risen, 2016). Similarly, the UK government passed the Investigatory Powers 
		
Act in 2016 that provides for unprecedented surveillance and hacking by the security services but 
fails to guarantee sufficient protection for journalists’ sources. ‘We do have to worry about a UK 
Donald Trump’, commented one British lawmaker, Lord Strasburger. ‘If we do end up with one, 
and that is not impossible, we have created the tools for repression’ (quoted in MacAskill, 2016). 
Politicians like Donald Trump have, therefore, inherited anti-democratic tools that can be used 
against legitimate journalistic inquiry in the context of the rise of surveillance states and anti-
terror regimes. 
 Yet these authoritarian instincts - ones that can be easily exploited by populist actors – 
coincide with a reluctance to create effective systems of fully independent press self-regulation. 
So, for example, in the UK, the government has still not enforced the full recommendations of 
the Leveson Inquiry that were designed to hold the press to account for the kinds of 
misrepresentation and distortion that was so evident, particularly in relation to coverage of 
immigration, in the run-up to the Brexit vote, in the popular press. Tabloid excesses are then 
intensified by the less shrill but nevertheless deep-rooted ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 1995) of 
elite journalism that continues to ‘flag’ the importance of national identity and thus gives further 
ground to those on the right who wish to demonise ‘outsiders’. In this situation, the failure to 
ensure that there is low-cost access to justice for those individuals and groups who have been 
unfairly targeted by right-wing media together with what Victor Pickard (2018: 197) calls the 
‘slow-but-sure structural collapse of professional journalism’ both incentivises journalists to 
pursue stories that target and scapegoat minorities and interrupts their ability to report on 
complex socio-economic issues that the far right are quick to sensationalise and simplify.  
This is magnified by what Sarah Smarsh calls the ‘economic trench between reporter and 
reported’ (Smarsh, 2016) – the fact that the highest levels of journalism are increasingly filled by 
		
those who can afford to go to journalism school and who are thus most likely to be drawn from 
elite networks who are less familiar with the economic and cultural anxieties of the groups 
targeted by right-wing populists. ‘That the term “populism” has become a pejorative among 
prominent liberal commentators should give us great pause’ argues Smarsh. ‘A journalism that 
embodies the plutocracy it’s supposed to critique has failed its watchdog duty and lost the 
respect of people who call bullshit when they see it’ (Smarsh, 2016). One response to this might 
be to introduce new levies on digital intermediaries to fund new entrants to the profession, 
particularly representing marginalised groups, in order to correct this imbalance but this is seen 
by austerity-minded governments as tax-raising initiatives that have no part to play in a dynamic 
market economy. 
 
Failure to nurture independent public service media 
 
One of the great fears of mainstream journalism is that partisan media environments fuel political 
polarisation (and vice-versa) and destabilise democracy by shifting the political centre of gravity 
away from a ‘moderate’ consensus to ‘extremes’. Media outlets in deregulated and highly 
commercial media systems gravitate towards wherever ratings and profits are to be found while 
media in authoritarian states are often ‘captured’ by business interests working closely with 
governments (Schiffrin, 2017). In this context, one potential solution is regularly proposed: an 
independent public service news media that is strong enough to defy the pressure of both 
government and market and to serve citizens without fear or favour. According to this narrative, 
public service media allegedly offer the best prospect of impartial, high-quality journalism that is 
insulated from the partisanship that feeds ‘extremism’. The European Broadcasting Union 
		
(2016), for example, argues that countries with strong public service media traditions are likely 
to have greater press freedom, higher voter turnout, less corruption and lower levels of right-
wing extremism. 
 In reality, far from retaining independence from all vested interests and delivering a 
critical and robust public interest journalism, public service media are often far too implicated in 
and attached to existing elite networks of power to be able to offer an effective challenge to them 
(Freedman, 2018). Indeed, public service media are likely to be intertwined – through funding 
arrangements, elite capture and unaccountable modes of governance – with the specific 
configurations of political power in their ‘home’ states in the same ways as are commercial 
media. The BBC, for example, may be publicly committed to impartial reporting but by 
marginalising voices that are not part of the established liberal consensus and by normalising 
those closest to official sources (Mills, 2016), it invites criticism from both left and right.  
Indeed, in Europe, public service media appears to be a particularly ineffective bulwark 
against extremism given the sizeable votes in recent years for far right politicians in countries 
like Austria, Germany, France and the Netherlands, all of which have high levels of consumption 
of public service content. These channels find it difficult either to transcend the tensions and 
polarisation that mark their wider political environments or to establish themselves as fully 
independent of power elites. In part, this is because public service media across the globe have 
been hollowed out – their funding has been cut, their staffing reduced and their services suffused 
with a market logic – in ways that make it increasingly difficult for them to provide an 
authoritative centrist challenge to political polarisation; in part it is also because their remit is 
constituted by the very same elites that are so hostile to far right populism. This is not to 
denigrate the need for meaningfully independent public media services that can act as a 
		
counterweight to vested interests but simply to note that existing institutions have all too often 
been identified with precisely the same power elites that right-wing populists claim they are 
seeking to challenge. 
 
Conclusion: towards a new policy paradigm 
 
Media policy failures did not cause the rise of Trump, the Alternative for Germany, the People’s 
Party in Austria or indeed Brexit. Those have other structural causes related to legacies of 
racism, experiences of insecurity and disenchantment with a political system that rewards people 
so unequally. What is remarkable, however, is the extent to which those most contemptuous of 
right-wing populism’s anti-elite narratives are so reluctant to acknowledge their own complicity 
in facilitating the discursive and material conditions they now seek to oppose. This is as true for 
media elites as it is true for other areas of political life. Liberal media policies have been unable 
to lay the basis for independent, critical and representative media systems that would articulate 
and respond to the very diverse sets of concerns that citizens have in their respective 
environments. Policy silences paved the way for the emergence of powerful and yet 
unaccountable digital intermediaries through whose channels travels the ‘fake news’ widely 
believed by mainstream politicians and commentators to have corrupted democratic politics. 
Policy silences smoothed the path for the implantation of commercial values throughout our 
communications systems, unshackling conceptions of the public interest from corporate 
responsibility so that poisonous coverage of refugees and other minorities is entirely legitimate 
and constitutionally protected while far right populist figures litter news bulletins because a 
business logic demands it.  
		
These policy silences are intensified by a regulatory failure to challenge the intimacy of 
governments and media executives – a familiarity which further contaminates democratic 
societies and simply hands ammunition to far right populists who are then able to attack 
mainstream media as representatives of elite power. Liberal media policy with its commitment to 
market forces, its privileging of corporate speech rights, its complicity with the establishment 
and its technocratic obsession for innovation ahead of the public interest, is therefore severely 
implicated in the growth of those reactionary movements that it is now affronted by. It has 
achieved this not by advocating or protecting populist actors but by repeatedly failing to produce 
conditions in which a representative and pluralistic public media could be sustained.  
If centrist politicians and mainstream media really wished to remove the conditions in 
which anti-democratic forces are able to grow, they would acknowledge that is time for radically 
new communications policies – not solutions to right-wing populism per se so much as responses 
to degenerated media environments that have been captured by corporate and state elites. We 
need a new policy paradigm to supersede the market-oriented approach outlined by Van 
Cuilenburrg and McQuail (2003), one that is based not simply around notions of freedom, access 
and accountability as they suggested, but on the redistribution that is necessary to confront the 
abuse of media power by states and corporations.  
This is a paradigm designed to cater to the needs above all of disaffected citizens and 
depends on reversing the policy failures that I have outlined in this article. Instead of allowing 
further concentrations of media power, a redistributive media policy will seek to break up 
existing oligopolies and tackle the corrupting influence that comes with market domination; 
instead of bowing down to the giant digital intermediaries whose algorithms increasingly 
structure patterns of everyday life, a redistributive model will seek to find ways to use these 
		
algorithms better to serve the public interest, in part by forcing private companies to share their 
proprietary models; a redistributive model will siphon cash from the giant stockpiles held by the 
largest intermediaries to support new, non-profit grass-roots journalism start-ups with a mandate 
to serve diverse audiences; and, finally, a redistributive model would seek to construct vibrant 
public media systems that are independent of vested interests and meaningfully able to hold 
power to account, to cater to all audiences, irrespective of partisan affiliation and social 
background, and to cut the ground from underneath the poison of the far right.  
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